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2.1 Abstract 
 
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and 
information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural 
choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions between the players, and quantitatively 
characterizes the conflicting incentives and strategic responses. In this chapter, we provide an 
overview of deception games in three different environments and extend the baseline signaling 
game models to include evidence through side-channel knowledge acquisition to capture the 
information asymmetry, dynamics, and strategic behaviors of deception. We analyze the 
deception in binary information space based on signaling game framework with a detector that 
gives off probabilistic evidence of the deception when the sender acts deceptively. We then focus 
on a class of continuous one-dimensional information space and take into account the cost of 
deception in the signaling game. We finally explore the multi-stage incomplete-information 
Bayesian game model for defensive deception for advanced persistent threats (APTs).  We use 
the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) as the solution concept for the deception games 
and analyze the strategic equilibrium behaviors for both the deceivers and the deceivees.  
 
 
2.2 Introduction 
Deception is a technique used to cause animals [9], human [13, 35] or computer systems [3] to have 
false beliefs. The purpose of deception is to mislead the deceivees to behave against their interests 
but favorably to the deceiver. It is a fundamental type of interactions that can be found in 
applications ranging from biology [9] to criminology [35] and from economics [13] to the Internet 
of Things (IoT) [31]. Cyberspace creates particular opportunities for deception, since information 
lacks permanence, imputing responsibility is difficult [20], and some agents lack repeated 
interactions [24]. For instance, online interactions are vulnerable to identify theft [14] and spear 
phishing [1], and authentication in the IoT suffers from a lack of infrastructure and local 
computational resources [2].
 Deception can be used as an approach for attacks. For example, phishing is a typical deception-
based attack that is one of the top threat vectors for cyberattacks [32]. Phishing can be email-based 
in which a phisher manipulates the email to appear as a legitimate request for sensitive information 
[4, 5]. It can also be website-based in which the deceiver uses genuine looking content to 
camouflage a legitimate website to attract target deceivees to reveal their personal data such as 
credit card information and social security number. Defenders can also implement deception. 
Defenders in the security and privacy domains have proposed, e.g., honeynets [7], moving target 
defense [39], obfuscation [30], and mix networks [36]. Using these techniques, defenders can 
obscure valuable data such as personally identifiable information or the configuration of a network. 
Using these approaches, defenders can send false information to attackers to waste their resources or 
distract them from critical assets. They can also obscure valuable data such as sensitive information 
or the configuration of a network to avoid direct accesses from the attackers. Both malicious and 
defensive deception have innumerable implications for cybersecurity. Successful deception 
fundamentally depends on the information asymmetry between the deceiver and the deceivee. 
Deceivees make indirect observations of the true state and then make decisions. Deceivers can 
take advantage of this by pretending to be a trustworthy information provider. It is possible to fool, 
mislead, or confuse the deceivees. But the deceivers need to plan their strategies and take actions 
that may be costly. Therefore, successful deception also requires the deceivers to have the ability 
to acquire information, accurately understand the goals of the deceivees, and make the induced 
actions predictable. 
 
The deceivers strategically manipulate the private information to suit their own self-interests. The 
manipulated information is then revealed to the deceivees, who, on the other hand, make decisions 
based on the information received. It is important for the deceivee to form correct beliefs based on 
past observations, take into account the potential damage caused by deception, and strategically use 
the observed information for decision-making. If deception is necessary to achieve the deceivers’ 
goal that would cause damages to the deceivees, the deceivees can then be prepared to invest 
resources in detecting and denying the deceptions as well as recovering the damage.  
 
Modeling deceptive interactions online and in the IoT would allow government policymakers, 
technological entrepreneurs, and vendors of cyber-insurance to predict changes in these 
interactions for the purpose of legislation, development of new technology, or risk mitigation. 
Game-theoretic models are natural frameworks to capture the adversarial and defensive 
interactions between players [11, 16, 22, 23, 37, 42, 50, 51, 52, 53]. It can provide a quantitative 
measure of the quality of protection with the concept of Nash equilibrium where both defender 
and an attacker seek optimal strategies, and no one has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from 
their equilibrium strategies despite their conflict for security objectives. The equilibrium concept 
also provides a quantitative prediction of the security outcomes of the scenario the game model 
captures. With the quantitative measures of security, game theory makes security manageable 
beyond the strong qualitative assurances of cryptographic protections. Recently, we have seen 
game-theoretic methods applied to deal with problems in cross-layer cyber-physical security [23, 
31, 40, 52, 54, 55], cyber deception [16, 27, 28, 29, 37, 53], moving target defense [39, 56, 57], 
critical infrastructure protection [19, 50, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61], adversarial machine learning [30, 62, 
63, 64, 65], insider threats [66, 67], and cyber risk management [68, 69, 70, 71]. 
 
This chapter shows a class of modeling of deception based on signaling games to provide a generic, 
quantitative, and systematic understanding of deceptions in the cyber-domain. We show three 
variants of the model to illustrate the applications in different situations. We consider the cases when 
the deceivee is allowed to acquire knowledge through investigations or by deploying detectors. The 
baseline signaling game model is extended to include evidence through side-channel knowledge 
acquisition. We also show a multi-stage Bayesian game with two-sided incomplete information and 
present a dynamic belief update and an iterative decision process that are used to develop long-
term optimal defensive policies to deter the deceivers and mitigate the loss. 
 
 
2.2.1 Related Work 
 
Deception game is related to a class of security games of incomplete information. For example, 
Powell in [34] has considered a game between an attacker and a defender, where the defender has 
private information about the vulnerability of their targets under protection. Powell models the 
information asymmetric interactions between players by a signaling game, and finds a pooling 
equilibrium where the defender chooses to pool, i.e., allocate resources in the same way for all 
targets of different vulnerabilities, and the attacker cannot know the true level of vulnerability of 
all targets. Brown et al. [6] have studied a zero-sum game between an attacker and a defender in 
the scenario of ballistic missile positioning. They have introduced the incomplete information to 
investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the players’ access to information. 
 
Previous literature has also considered deception in a variety of scenarios including proactive 
defense against advanced persistent threats [11,16,17,19,37], moving target defense [8, 39, 41], and 
social engineering [28, 29, 42]. Horák et al. [16] have considered a class of cyber deception 
techniques in the field of network security and studied the impact of the deception on attacker’s 
beliefs using the quantitative framework of the game theory by taking into account the sequential 
nature of the attack and investigating how attacker’s belief evolves and influences the actions of 
the players. Zhang et al., [37] have proposed an equilibrium approach to analyze the GPS spoofing 
in a model of signaling game with continuous type space. They have found a PBNE with pooling 
in low types and separating in high types, and provided an equilibrium analysis of spoofing. The 
hypothesis testing game framework in [43] has studied the influence of deceptive information on 
the decision making and analyzed the worst-case scenario by constructing equilibrium strategies.  
The model proposed by Ettinger et al. [10] has used an equilibrium approach to belief deception 
in bargaining problems when the agents only have coarse information about their opponent’s 
strategy.  
 
 
2.2.2 Organization of the Chapter 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we briefly describe common game-theoretic 
approaches for security models and introduce the basic signaling game model and define the 
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). In Section 2.3 we formulate the deception using a 
signaling game model with a detector over a binary information space, and describe the 
equilibrium result. In Section 2.4, we present a signaling-game-based framework of a deception 
game to model the strategic behaviors over a continuous one-dimensional information space. We 
also consider the knowledge acquisition for the receiver through investigations. In Section 2.5, we 
show a multi-stage Bayesian game framework to model the deception in advanced persistent 
threats. Section 2.6 discusses the results and provides concluding remarks.  
 
 
2.3 Game Theory in Security 
 
Game theory is the systems science that studies interactions between rational and strategic players 
(or agents) that are coupled in their decision makings. Players are rational in the sense that they 
choose actions to optimize their own objectives (e.g., utility or cost), which capture varying 
interaction contexts. Being strategic in game theory refers to that players choose their own actions 
by anticipating the actions of the other agents. Their decision makings are coupled because their 
objective functions depend both on their own actions, and on the actions of the other players. 
Among the game-theoretic cybersecurity models, Stackelberg game, Nash game, and signaling 
game account for the most commonly used approaches [28].  
 
Stackelberg games consist of a leader (L) and a follower (F). L has actions 𝑎"Î	𝐴" and receives 
utility 𝑈", and F has actions 𝑎&Î	𝐴& and receives utility 𝑈&. Once both players have taken actions, 
L receives utility 𝑈"(𝑎", 𝑎&) and 𝑈&(𝑎", 𝑎&). In Stackelberg games, F acts after knowing L’s 
action. Therefore, defensive cybersecurity models often take the defender as the leader and the 
attacker as the follower by considering the worst-case scenario that the attacker will observe and 
react to defensive strategies. Let 𝒫(𝐴) denote the power set of the set 𝐴. Let 𝐵𝑅&: 𝐴" → 𝒫(𝐴&) 
denote the best response of F to L’s action such that 𝐵𝑅&(𝑎") gives the optimal 𝑎& to respond to 𝑎". Best response can be one single action or a set of equally optimal actions. The function 𝐵𝑅& is 
defined as 
 𝐵𝑅& 𝑎" = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥45∈75 	𝑈& 𝑎", 𝑎& . 
By anticipating 𝐵𝑅& 𝑎" , L chooses optimal action 𝑎"∗  which satisfies  
 𝑎"∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥45∈75 	𝑈" 𝑎", 𝐵𝑅& 𝑎" . 
The action profile (𝑎"∗, 𝑎&∗ ) characterizes the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, where 𝑎&∗ ∈𝐵𝑅& 𝑎"∗ . 
 
In Nash games, on the other hand, players commit to his or her own strategy and move 
simultaneously or before knowing the other player’s action [28]. Let H and T denote two players 
in a Nash game with actions 𝑎: 	∈ 	𝐴: and 𝑎; 	∈ 	𝐴;, respectively. Define 𝐵𝑅: 𝑎;  as the best 
response for H that optimally respond to T’s action 𝑎;. Similarly, let 𝐵𝑅; 𝑎:  be the best response 
for T. Nash equilibrium is the solution concept of such games, which is defined by a strategy 
profile (𝑎:∗ , 𝑎;∗ ), where 
 𝑎:∗ ∈ 	𝐵𝑅: 𝑎; , 
 𝑎;∗ ∈ 	𝐵𝑅; 𝑎: . 
 
In other words, Nash equilibrium requires each player to simultaneously choose a strategy that is 
optimal given the other player’s optimal strategy. In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, each player 
chooses one specific strategy (i.e., one pure strategy), while in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, at 
least on player randomizes over some or all pure strategies.  
 
A signaling game is a two-player dynamic game of incomplete information. Signaling game 
typically names two players as sender (S, she) and receiver (R, he) [12]. Signaling game is 
information asymmetric because the sender privately possesses some information that is unknown 
to the receiver. The private information is usually referred to as state (or type) of the world. The 
sender communicates the receiver by sending a message, and the receiver only learns about the state 
through the message. Generally, the degree of conflict of interest between S and R may range from 
perfectly aligned (e.g., Lewis signaling game [21]) to completely opposite (e.g., zero-sum game 
[33]). The timing of the game is described as follows: 
 
1. Nature randomly draws a state with a prior common to both players, and the sender 
privately observes the state. 
2. The sender sends a message to the receiver. 
3. The receiver takes an action upon observing the message.  
 
One key feature of cyber deception is the multi-stage execution of the attack. A deceiver has to 
engage the deceivee in multiple rounds of interactions to gain the trust. The dynamic interactions 
have been observed in APT threats and the operation of honey devices [19]. Hence signaling games 
provide a suitable description of essential features of the deception, and the basic signaling game 
models will be elaborated in the following section. 
 
 
2.3.1 Signaling Game Model 
 
Let 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩 denote the state privately possessed by 𝑆 that is unknown to 𝑅. The state space 𝛩 can 
be discrete (e.g., 𝛩? ≡ {𝜃B, 𝜃C}) or continuous (e.g., 𝛩E ≡ [𝜃, 𝜃]). For example, the state could 
represent, whether the sender is a malicious or benign actor, whether she has one set of preferences 
over another, samples of data stream, and location coordinate. For simplicity but without loss of 
generality, we focus on discrete state space in this introductory description of the signaling game. 
The state 𝜃  is drawn according to a prior distribution common to both players. Harsanyi 
conceptualized the state selection as a randomized move by a non-strategic player called nature. 
Let 𝑝 denote the probability mass function of the state, where 𝑝I∈JK (𝜃) = 1. All aspects of the 
game except the value of the true state 𝜃 are common knowledge. 
 
After privately observing the state 𝜃 , 𝑆  chooses a message 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 . Let 𝜎O ∈ 𝛤O  denote the 
behavioral strategy of 𝑆 to choose 𝑚 based on 𝜃. She could use pure strategy 𝜎O(𝜃) as well as 
mixed strategy 𝜎O(𝑚|𝜃) , such that 𝜎O(𝜃)  chooses message 𝑚  given 𝜃  and 𝜎O(𝑚|𝜃)  gives 
probability with which 𝑆 sends message 𝑚 given the state 𝜃. We assume the pure strategy 𝜎O(𝜃) 
induces a conditional probability 𝑞O(𝑚|𝜃) ∈ [0,1]. 
 
After receiving 𝑚, 𝑅 forms a posterior belief µU of the true state such that µU(θ|𝑚): Θ → [0,1] 
gives the likelihood with which R believes that the true state is θ given the message 𝑚. Based on 
the belief µU, 𝑅 then chooses an action a ∈ A according to a strategy σU ∈ ΓU. Similarly, 𝑅 may 
employ pure strategy σU(𝑚) or mixed strategy σU(𝑎|𝑚), where σU(𝑚) yields the action 𝑅	acts 
upon the message m, and σU(𝑎|𝑚) produces the probability with which 𝑅 takes action 𝑎 given 
message m. The action a is the final decision of 𝑅 that represents the inference about the true state. 
Let 𝑈O:  Θ×M×A → ℝ denote a utility function for 𝑆 such that 𝑈O θ,𝑚, 𝑎  yields the utility of the 
player when her type is θ, she sends message 𝑚, and 𝑅 plays action 𝑎. Similarly, let 𝑈b:  Θ×M×A 
denote R’s utility function so that 𝑈b θ,𝑚, 𝑎  gives his payoff under the same scenario. 
 
 
2.3.2 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
 
In two player games, Nash equilibrium defines a strategy profile in which each player best 
responds to the optimal strategies of the other player. Signaling games motivate the extension of 
Nash equilibrium in two ways. First, information asymmetry requires 𝑅 to maximize his expected 
utility over the possible types of 𝑆. An equilibrium in which 𝑆 and 𝑅 best respond to each other’s 
strategies given some belief 𝜇b is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, 𝑅 is required 
to update 𝜇b rationally. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) captures this constraint and is 
described at Definition 1. 
 
Definition 2.1: (Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a 
signaling profile (𝜎O∗, 𝜎b∗) and a posterior belief system 𝜇b such that: 
1. (𝐶C): ∀𝜃, 𝜎O∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥fg𝑈O(𝜃, 𝜎O, 𝜎b∗),  
2. (𝐶h): ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝜎b∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥fi 𝜇bI (𝜃|𝑚)𝑈b(𝑚, 𝜎b, 𝜃), 
and 
3. (𝐶j ): 𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚) = k(I)fg∗(l|I)km′ (In)fg∗(l|In) , if 𝑝In (𝜃o)𝜎O∗(𝑚|𝜃o) > 0 ; and 𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚)  is any 
probability distribution on 𝛩 if 𝑝In (𝜃o)𝜎O∗(𝑚|𝜃o) = 0. 
 
In Definition 2.1, 𝐶C  and 𝐶h  are the perfection conditions for 𝑆  and 𝑅 , respectively, that 
characterizes the sequential rationality of both players. Specifically, 𝐶C captures that 𝑆 optimally 
determines 𝜎O∗ by taking into account the effect of 𝜎O on 𝜎b. 𝐶h says that 𝑅 responds rationally 
to 𝑆’s strategy given his posterior belief about the state 𝜃. 𝐶j states that the posterior belief is 
updated based on Bayes’ rule. If the observation is a probability-0 event, then Bayes’ rule is not 
applicable. In this case, any posterior beliefs over the state space is admissible. 𝐶j also implies 
that the consistency between the posterior beliefs and strategies: belief is updated depending on 
the strategy that is optimal given the belief. There are three categories of strategies: separating, 
pooling, and partially-pooling equilibria, which are defined based on the strategy of 𝑆 . In 
separating PBNE (S-PBNE), 𝑆 chooses different strategies for different states. In this case, 𝑅 is 
able to identify each state with certainty. In pooling PBNE (P-PBNE), 𝑆  chooses the same 
strategy for different states. This strategy makes the corresponding message 𝑚 uninformative to 𝑅. In partially-pooling PBNE (PP-PBNE), however, 𝑆 chooses messages with different, but not 
completely distinguishable, strategies for different states. This makes the belief of 𝑅  remain 
uncertain. 
 
2.4 Binary State Space: Leaky Deception using Signaling Game with Evidence 
 
In [27], Pawlick et al. have modeled the strategic interactions between the deceiver 𝑆 and the 
deceivee 𝑅 over a binary information space by extending signaling games by including a detector 
that gives off probabilistic warnings called evidence when 𝑆 acts deceptively. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Signaling games with evidence add the red detector block to the S and 
R blocks. The probability λ e θ,𝑚) of emitting evidence e depends on S’s type θ 
and the message m that she transmits [27]. 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Game-Theoretic Model 
With reference to Fig. 2.1, the detector emits evidences based on whether the message m is equal 
to the state θ. The detector emits 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 ≡ {0,1} by the probability λ e | θ,𝑚 . Let e = 1 denote an 
alarm and e = 0  no alarm. The evidence e  is assumed to be emitted with an exogeneous 
probability that neither 𝑅 nor 𝑆 can control. In this respect, the detector can be seen as a second 
move by nature. Let β ∈ [0,1] be the true-positive rate of the detector. For simplicity, both true-
positive rates are set to be equal: β = λ(1 | 0,1) = λ(1 | 1,0). Similarly, let α ∈ [0,1] denote the 
false-positive rate of the detector with α = λ(1 | 0,0) = λ(1 | 1,1). A valid detector has β ≥ α. 
This is without loss of generality, because otherwise α and β can be relabeled. The timing of the 
game becomes: 
1. Nature randomly draws state θ ∈ {0,1} according to p(θ).  
2.  𝑆 privately observes θ and then chooses a message m based on strategy σy(𝑚|θ).  
3. The detector emits evidence e ∈ {0,1} with λ(e|θ,𝑚).  
4. After receiving both 𝑚 and 𝑒, 𝑅 forms a belief system 𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚, 𝑒) and then chooses an 
action 𝑎 ∈ {0,1} according to strategy 𝜎b(𝑎|𝑚, 𝑒). 
 
The following assumptions characterizes a cheap-talk signaling game with evidence. The message 𝑚 is payoff-irrelevant in a cheap-talk signaling game. 
Assumption 2.1: The utilities 𝑈O and 𝑈b satisfy the following assumptions: 
 
1. 𝑈O and 𝑈b do not depend exogenously on 𝑚.  
R: 𝜎𝑅 𝑎 𝑚, 𝑒 )S: 𝜎𝑆 𝑚 𝜃)
𝜆 𝑒 𝜃,𝑚)
type 𝜃 message 𝑚 action 𝑎
∈ {0,1} ∈ {0,1} ∈ {0,1}
evidence 𝑒
∈ {0,1}
2. ∀𝑚,𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑈b 0,𝑚, 0 > 𝑈b 0,𝑚 , 1 .  
3. ∀𝑚,𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑈b 1,𝑚, 0 < 𝑈b 1,𝑚 , 1 .  
4. ∀𝑚,𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑈O 0,𝑚, 0 < 𝑈O 0,𝑚 , 1 .  
5. ∀𝑚,𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑢O 1,𝑚, 0 > 𝑢O 1,𝑚 , 1 . 
 
Assumption 2.1-1 implies that the interaction is a cheap-talk signaling game. Assumption 2.1-2 
and 2.1-3 state that 𝑅 receives higher utility if he correctly chooses 𝑎 = 𝜃 than if he chooses 𝑎 ≠𝜃. Finally, Assumption 2.1-4 and 2.1-5 say that 𝑆 receives higher utility if 𝑅 chooses 𝑎 ≠ 𝜃 than 
if he chooses 𝑎 = 𝜃. 
Utilities. Define an expected utility function 𝑈O: 𝛤×𝛤b → ℝ  such that 𝑈(𝜎O, 𝜎b|𝜃)  gives the 
expected utility to 𝑆 when she plays strategy 𝜎O given that the state is 𝜃. This expected utility is 
given by 𝑈O 𝜎O, 𝜎b | 𝜃 = 𝜎b 𝑎 | 𝑚, 𝑒 𝜆 𝑒 | 𝜃,𝑚 𝜎O 𝑚 | 𝜃 𝑈O 𝜃,𝑚, 𝑎l∈~∈4∈7 .														(2.1) 
The involvement of evidence 𝑒 in Eq. (2.1) is due to the dependence of 𝑅’s strategy 𝜎b(𝑎|𝑚, 𝑒). 𝑆  must anticipate the probability of leaking evidence 𝑒  by using 𝜆(𝑒|𝜃,𝑚). Similarly, define 𝑈b: 𝛤 → ℝ such that 𝑈b(𝜎b|𝜃,𝑚, 𝑒) gives the expected utility to 𝑅 when he plays strategy 𝜎b 
given message 𝑚, evidence 𝑒, and state 𝜃. The expected utility function is given by 𝑈b(𝜎b | 𝜃,𝑚, 𝑒) = 𝜎b4∈7 𝑎 | 𝑚, 𝑒 𝑈b 𝜃,𝑚, 𝑎 . 
 
 
2.4.2 Equilibrium Concept 
 
The involvement of the evidence extends the PBNE in Definition 2.2 as follows.  
Definition 2.2: (PBNE with Evidence) A PBNE of a cheap-talk signaling game with evidence is 
a strategy profile (𝜎O∗, 𝜎b∗) and posterior beliefs 𝜇b(𝜃 | 𝑚, 𝑒) such that ∀𝜃 ∈ 𝛩,	𝜎O∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥fg∈g  𝑈O 𝜎O, 𝜎b∗ | 𝜃 ,																		(2.2) ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀,	∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐸, 
𝜎b∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥fi∈i   𝜇bI∈J 𝜃 | 𝑚, 𝑒 𝑈b 𝜎b   𝜃,𝑚, 𝑒 ,			(2.3) 
and if 𝜆I∈J (𝑒 |  𝜃 ,𝑚)𝜎O(𝑚 |  𝜃)𝑝(𝜃) > 0, then 𝜇b 𝜃 | 𝑚, 𝑒 = 𝜆 𝑒 | 𝜃,𝑚 𝜇b 𝜃 | 𝑚𝜆I∈J 𝑒 |  𝜃 ,𝑚 𝜇b 𝜃  | 𝑚 ,												(2.4) 
where 
𝜇b 𝜃 | 𝑚 = 𝜎O 𝑚 | 𝜃 𝑝 𝜃𝜎OI∈J 𝑚 |  𝜃 𝑝 𝜃 .																											(2.5) 
If 𝜆I∈J (𝑒 |  𝜃 ,𝑚)𝜎O(𝑚 |  𝜃)𝑝(𝜃) = 0,  then 𝜇b 𝜃 | 𝑚, 𝑒  may be set to any probability 
distribution over 𝛩. 
 
Eq. (2.4)-(2.5) extend 𝐶j in Definition 2.2. First, 𝑅 updates her belief according to 𝑚 using Eq. 
(2.5); then 𝑅 updates her belief according to 𝑒 using Eq. (2.4). When 𝑆 plays pooling strategy, i.e., ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝜎O(𝑚|0) = 𝜎O(𝑚|1). In this case, the message 𝑚 is uninformative, and 𝑅 updates his 
belief only depends on the evidence 𝑒, i.e., 𝜇b 𝜃 | 𝑚, 𝑒 = 𝜆 𝑒 | 𝜃,𝑚 𝑝 𝜃𝜆I∈J 𝑒 |  𝜃 ,𝑚 𝑝 𝜃 .																						(2.6) 
 
2.4.3 Equilibrium Results 
 
Under Assumption 2.1-1 to 2.1-5, the cheap talk signaling game with evidence admits no 
separating PBNE. This results from the opposing utility functions of S and R. S wants to deceive R, and R wants to correctly guess the type. It is not incentive-compatible for S to fully reveal the 
type by choosing a separating strategy. For brevity, define the following notations: ΔBU ≜ uU θ = 0,𝑚, 𝑎 = 0 − uU θ = 0,𝑚, 𝑎 = 1 , ΔCU ≜ uU θ = 1,𝑚, 𝑎 = 1 − uU θ = 1,𝑚, 𝑎 = 0 . ΔBU gives the benefit to R for correctly guessing the type when θ = 0, and ΔCU gives the benefit to R for correctly guessing the type when θ = 1. Lemmas 2.1-2.2 solve for σU∗ within five regimes 
of the prior probability p(θ) of each type θ ∈ {0,1}. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2: PBNE differ within five prior probability regimes. In the Zero-
Dominant regime, p θ =1 ≈ 0  i.e., type 0 dominates. In the Zero-Heavy 
regime, p(θ = 1) is slightly higher, but still low. In the Middle regime, the types 
are mixed almost evenly. The One- Heavy regime has a higher p θ =1 , and 
the One-Dominant regime has p θ =1 ≈ 1. The definitions of the regime 
boundaries depend on whether the detector is conservative or aggressive. 
 
 
 
Lemma 2.1: For pooling PBNE, 𝑅’s optimal actions 𝜎b∗ for evidence 𝑒 and messages 𝑚 on the 
equilibrium path1 vary within five regimes of 𝑝(𝜃). The top half of Fig. 2.2 lists the boundaries 
of these regimes for detectors in which 𝛽 < 1 − 𝛼, and the bottom half of Fig. 2.2 lists the 
boundaries of these regimes for detectors in which 𝛽 > 1 − 𝛼. 
 
The regimes in Fig. 2.2 shift towards the right as ΔBU  increases. Intuitively, a higher p(1) is 
necessary to balance out the benefit to R for correctly identifying a type θ = 0 as ΔBU increases. 
The regimes shift towards the left as ΔCU increases for the opposite reason. 
 
Lemma 2.2 gives the optimal strategies of R in response to pooling behavior within each of the 
five parameter regimes. 
 
Lemma 2.2: For each regime, 𝜎b∗ on the equilibrium path is listed in Table 2.1 if 𝛽 < 1 − 𝛼 
and in Table 2.2 if 𝛽 > 1 − 𝛼. The row labels correspond to the Zero-Dominant (O-D), Zero-
Heavy (0-H), Middle, One-Heavy (1-H), and One-Dominant (1-D) regimes. 
 
Table 2.1:  𝜎b∗(1 |𝑚, 𝑒) in Pooling PBNE with 𝛽 > 1 − 𝛼. 
 𝜎b∗(1 | 0,0) 𝜎b∗(1 | 0,1) 𝜎b∗(1 | 1,0) 𝜎b∗(1 | 1,1) 
0-D 0 0 0 0 
																																																						
1 In pooling PBNE, the message “on the equilibrium path” is the one that is sent by both types of 𝑆. Messages “off the equilibrium path” are never sent in equilibrium, although determining the 
actions that 𝑅 would play if 𝑆 were to transmit a message off the path is necessary in order to 
determine the existence of equilibria. 
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𝑅
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(Conservative)
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(Aggressive)
0-H 0 1 0 0 
Middle 0 1 1 0 
1-H 1 1 1 0 
1-D 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 2.2: 𝜎b∗(1 |𝑚, 𝑒) in Pooling PBNE with 𝛽 > 1 − 𝛼. 
 𝜎b∗(1 | 0,0) 𝜎b∗(1 | 0,1) 𝜎b∗(1 | 1,0) 𝜎b∗(1 | 1,1) 
0-D 0 0 0 0 
0-H 0 0 1 0 
Middle 0 1 1 0 
1-H 0 1 1 1 
1-D 1 1 1 1 
 
Lemmas 2.3-2.4 give conditions under which the beliefs 𝜇b exist such that each pooling strategy 
is optimal for both types of 𝑆. 
 
Lemma 2.3: Let 𝑚 be the message on the equilibrium path. If 𝜎b∗(1 | 𝑚, 0) = 𝜎b∗(1 | 𝑚, 1), 
then there exists a 𝜇b such that pooling on message 𝑚 is optimal for both types of 𝑆. For brevity, 
let 𝑎∗ ≜ 𝜎b∗(1 | 𝑚, 0) = 𝜎b∗(1 | 𝑚, 1). Then 𝜇b is given by, ∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,	𝜇b 𝜃 = 𝑎∗ | 1 − 𝑚, 𝑒 ≥ 𝛥C4∗b𝛥C4∗b + 𝛥4∗b . 
 
Lemma 2.4: If 𝜎b∗(1 | 𝑚, 0) = 1 − 𝜎b∗(1 | 𝑚, 1) and 𝛽 ≠ 1 − 𝛼, then there does not exist a 𝜇b 
such that pooling on message 𝑚 is optimal for both types of 𝑆. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3: PBNE in each of the parameter regions defined in Fig. 2.2. For m∈{0,1}, S Pool on m”Pool on ach	σO∗ 𝑚 0 =	σO∗ 𝑚 1 = 1. For 	𝑎 ∈ {0,1}, R 
plays a”plays n achσ
b∗ 𝑎 0,0 =	σb∗ 𝑎 0,1 = σb∗ 𝑎 1,0 =	σb∗ 𝑎 1,1 = 1 . 
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Lemma 2.3 gives μ
b∗
. The Dominant regimes support pooling PBNE on both 
messages. The Heavy regimes support pooling PBNE on only one message. The 
Middle regime does not support any pooling PBNE. 
 
 
 
 
The pooling PBNE of the cheap-talk signaling game with evidence are summarized by Fig. 2.3. 
For β ≠ 1 − α, the Middle regime does not admit any pooling PBNE. This result is not found in 
conventional signaling games for deception, in which all regimes support pooling PBNE. It 
occurs because R’s responses to message m depends on e, i.e., σU∗(1 | 0,0) = 1 − σU∗(1 | 0,1) 
and σU∗(1 | 1,0) = 1 − σU∗(1 | 1,1). One of the types of S prefers to deviate to the message off 
the equilibrium path. Intuitively, for a conservative detector, S with type θ = 𝑚 prefers to deviate 
to message 1 −m, because his deception is unlikely to be detected. On the other hand, for an 
aggressive detector, S with type θ = 1 −𝑚 prefers to deviate to message 1 −𝑚, because his 
honesty is likely to produce a false-positive alarm, which will lead R to guess 𝑎 = 𝑚. 
 
For 𝛽 ≠ 1 − 𝛼, since the Middle regime does not support pooling PBNE, we search for partially-
separating PBNE. In these PBNE, 𝑆 and 𝑅 play mixed strategies. In mixed-strategy equilibria in 
general, each player chooses a mixed strategy that makes the other players indifferent between 
the actions that they play with positive probability. Theorems 2.1-2.2 give the results. 
 
Theorem 2.1: (Partially-Separating PBNE for Conservative Detectors) For 𝛽 < 1 − 𝛼, within 
the Middle Regime, there exists an equilibrium in which the sender strategies are 𝜎O∗ 𝑚 = 1 | 𝜃 = 0 = 𝛽h𝛽h − 𝛼h − 𝛼𝛽𝛥Cb𝛽h − 𝛼h 𝛥Bb 𝑝(1)1 − 𝑝(1) ,𝜎O∗ 𝑚 = 1 | 𝜃 = 1 = 𝛼𝛽𝛥Bb𝛽h − 𝛼h 𝛥Cb 1 − 𝑝(1)𝑝(1) − 𝛼h𝛽h − 𝛼h , 
the receiver strategies are 𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 0, 𝑒 = 0) =  1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽2 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 ,𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 0, 𝑒 = 1) =  1,𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 1, 𝑒 = 0) =  12 − 𝑎 − 𝑏 ,𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 1, 𝑒 = 1) =  0,
 
and the beliefs are computed by Bayes’ Law in all cases. 
Theorem 2.2: (Partially-Separating PBNE for Aggressive Detectors) For any 𝑔 ∈ [0,1], let 𝑔 ≜
1 − 𝑔. For 𝛽 > 1 − 𝛼, within the Middle Regime, there exists an equilibrium in which the sender 
strategies are 𝜎O∗ 𝑚 = 1 | 𝜃 = 0 = 𝛼𝛽𝛥Cb𝛼h − 𝛽h 𝛥Bb 𝑝(1)1 − 𝑝(1) − 𝛽
h𝛼h − 𝛽h ,𝜎O∗ 𝑚 = 1 | 𝜃 = 1 = 𝛼h𝛼h − 𝛽h − 𝛼𝛽𝛥Bb𝛼h − 𝛽h 𝛥Cb 1 − 𝑝(1)𝑝(1) ,
 
the receiver strategies are 𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 0, 𝑒 = 0) =  0,𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 0, 𝑒 = 1) =  1𝛼 + 𝛽 ,𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 1, 𝑒 = 0) =  1,𝜎b∗(𝑎 = 1 | 𝑚 = 1, 𝑒 = 1) =  𝛼 + 𝛽 − 1𝛼 + 𝛽 ,
 
and the beliefs are computed by Bayes’ Law in all cases. 
 
In Theorem 2.1, 𝑆 chooses the 𝜎O∗ that makes 𝑅 indifferent between 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑎 = 1 when he 
observes the pairs (𝑚 = 0, 𝑒 = 0) and (𝑚 = 1, 𝑒 = 0). This allows 𝑅 to choose mixed strategies 
for 𝜎b∗(1 | 0,0)  and 𝜎b∗(1 | 1,0).  Similarly, 𝑅  chooses 𝜎b∗(1 | 0,0)  and 𝜎b∗(1 | 1,0)  that make 
both types of 𝑆 indifferent between sending 𝑚 = 0 and 𝑚 = 1. This allows 𝑆 to choose mixed 
strategies. A similar pattern follows in Theorem 2.2 for 𝜎O∗, 𝜎b∗(1 | 0,1), and 𝜎b∗(1 | 1,1). 
 
 
 
2.5 Continuous State Space: Knowledge Acquisition and Fundamental Limits of Deception 
In [38], Zhang et al. proposes a game-theoretic framework of a deception game to model the strategic 
behaviors of the deceiver S and the deceivee R and construct strategies for both attacks and defenses 
over a continuous one-dimensional state space. R is allowed to acquire probabilistic evidence about 
the deception through investigations, and misrepresenting the state is costly for S. The deceivability 
of the deception game is analyzed by characterizing the PBNE. 
 
2.5.1 Game-Theoretic Model 
We assume that the state θ is continuously distributed over Θ ≡ [𝜃, θ] according to a differentiable 
probability distribution F(θ), with strictly positive density f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Again, all aspects of 
the game except the value of the true state θ are common knowledge. 
Message and Report. In this game model, we use the message to describe the format of 
information about the state S communicates to R. We introduce a notion report to represent the 
value of state carried by the message. After privately observing the state θ, S first determines a 
report r ∈ Θ for the true state θ, and then sends R a message 𝑚 ∈ M, where M is a Borel space of 
messages. Let Ω:M → Θ denote the report interpretation function such that Ω(𝑚) gives the report r carried in 𝑚. Given the true state θ, we say m tells the truth if Ω(𝑚) = θ. We assume that for 
each state θ ∈ Θ, there is a sufficiently large number of messages that yields the same report, and 
each 𝑚 ∈ M  has a unique value of report Ω(𝑚) . In other words, the message space can be 
partitioned as M =∪ M , with |M| → ∞  for all r  and M ∩ Mo = ∅  if r ≠ r′ , and ∀𝑚 ∈ M , Ω(𝑚) = r. This assumption can capture the feature of rich language in practical deceptions. We 
further assume that message 𝑚 is formed by “common language” that can be understood precisely 
by both S and R. In other words, function Ω is commonly known by both players. 
 
Strategies and actions. Let σy: Θ → Θ be the strategy of S such that r = σy(θ) determines the 
report r of the true state θ. Let ηy: Θ×Θ → M be the message strategy of S associated with σy such 
that 𝑚 = ηy(r) selects the message 𝑚 from M when the strategy σy(θ) determines the report r 
and the true state is θ. Given θ, the strategy σy(θ) determines the set of messages M( ) for ηy to 
choose from, and ηy determines which specific message 𝑚 ∈ M( ) to send. We assume σy(θ) 
associated with ηy induces a conditional probability qy(𝑚|θ). After receiving m, R chooses an 
action a ∈ A ≡ Θ  according to a strategy σU: Θ×M → A  using r = Ω(𝑚) . σU(r,𝑚)  gives the 
action R acts upon the message m (and thus r = Ω(𝑚)). The action a is the final decision of R that 
represents the inference about the true state. 
 
Utilities. The utility functions of S  is given by Uy(𝑎, θ, r) ≡ U£(a, θ) − kU¥(r, θ)  where U£(𝑎, θ) ≡ −(𝑎 − (θ + b))h is the utility depending on the induced action a in R, U¥ ≡ −(r −θ)h is the utility related to the misrepresentation of the true state, and k ≥ 0 quantifies the intensity 
of U¥. On the deceivee’s side, his utility is given by UU ≡ −(𝑎 − θ)h, which takes into account 
the risk induced by R’s misinference of the true state θ via his action 𝑎. Define, for all θ ∈ Θ, αy(θ) ≡ argmin4Cy(𝑎, θ, r),  and αU(θ) ≡ argmin4CU(𝑎, θ);  i.e., αU(θ)  and αy(θ)  are two 
actions taken by R as functions of θ that are the most preferred by R and S, respectively. 
 
Beliefs. Based on m (and thus r = Ω(𝑚)) and his prior belief f(θ), R forms a posterior belief µU: Θ → [0,1] of the true state θ ∈ Θ. The posterior belief µU(θ|𝑚) gives the likelihood with 
which R believes that the true state is θ based on m. R then determines which action to choose 
based on his belief µU. 
 
 
2.5.2 Deceivability 
We restrict attention to a class of monotone inflated deception, in which the strategy profile (σy, σU) satisfies conditions in the following definition. 
Definition 2.3: A deception with 𝑆’s strategy 𝜎O and 𝑅’s belief 𝜇b is monotone if 
 
1. 𝜎O(𝜃) is a non-decreasing function of 𝜃; 
2. 𝜎b(𝑟,𝑚) is a non-decreasing function of 𝑟. 
 
The deceivability can be quantified as follows. 
 
Definition 2.4: Given the state 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃¬, 𝜃o] , 𝑆 ’s strategy 𝜎O(𝜃) = 𝑟 , and message strategy 𝜂O(𝑟) = 𝑚, 
– 𝑅  is undeceivable over [𝜃¬, 𝜃o]  if 𝜎b(𝑟,𝑚) = 𝛼b(𝜃) ≡ 𝜃 , for all 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃¬, 𝜃,] . Here, 𝜎O(𝜃) ≠ 𝜎O(𝜃′)  for all 𝜃 ≠ 𝜃′ ∈ [𝜃¬, 𝜃o] , and 𝜂O(𝑟) ∈ 𝑀® . The corresponding 𝜇b  is 
informative. The interval [𝜃¬, 𝜃o] is called undeceivable region (UR). 
– 𝑅 is deceivable over [𝜃¬, 𝜃o] if the only knowledge she has is that 𝜃 lies in [𝜃¬, 𝜃o]. 𝑅 
chooses 𝜎b(𝑟,𝑚) = 𝑎b (𝜃¬, 𝜃o), by maximize the expected utility over [𝜃¬, 𝜃o], i.e., 
𝑎b (𝜃¬, 𝜃o) ∈ argmaxfi∈7 𝑈bI°In (𝜎b, 𝜃)𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃. 
Here, 𝜎O(𝜃) and 𝜂O(𝑟), respectively, choose the same report 𝑟 and the same message 𝑚, 
for all 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃¬, 𝜃o]. Thus, given 𝑚, 𝑞O(𝑚|𝜃) is the same for all 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃¬, 𝜃o], where 𝑞 ∈(0,1). The corresponding 𝜇b is uninformative. The interval [𝜃¬, 𝜃o] is called deceivable 
region (DR). 
 
 
2.5.3 Knowledge Acquisition: Evidence 
 
We allow 𝑅 to acquire additional knowledge through investigations when the state is in a DR, [𝜃¬, 𝜃o], by partitioning it into multiple intervals, denoted by a strictly increasing sequence, <𝜃B = 𝜃¬, 𝜃C, … , 𝜃´ = 𝜃o >. Then 𝑅 conducts investigations for each interval. Here, we consider 
the case when there are two investigation intervals to simplify the analysis. Let 𝜎µ ∈ (𝜃¬, 𝜃o) be 
the investigation partition state such that [𝜃¬, 𝜃o]  is partitioned into two non-overlapping 
investigation regions 𝛩B = [𝜃¬, 𝜃µ] and 𝛩C = [𝜃µ, 𝜃o]. Let 𝛹 ∈ 𝛤 = {𝛹B,𝛹C}, where 𝛹·  denote 
the event {𝜃 ∈ 𝛩·}, for 𝑖 = 0, 1, with the probability 𝑃(𝛹·) = º»¼ (I)½Iº[m°,mn] (I)½I. The investigation for 𝛩B  and 𝛩C  generates noisy evidence 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 = {0,1} , where 𝑒 = 𝑖  represents 𝛹· , for 𝑖 = 0 , 1 . 
Suppose that the investigation emits evidence by the probability 𝛾(𝑒|𝛹,𝑚) . Let 𝑥 = 𝛾(𝑒 =0|𝛹B,𝑚) and 𝑦 = 𝛾(𝑒 = 1|𝛹C,𝑚) be the two true positive rates, which are private information 
of 𝑅. 
With a slight abuse of notation, let 𝜎b(𝛹,𝑚, 𝑒): 𝛤×𝑀×𝐸 → 𝐴 be the strategy of 𝑅 with evidence 𝑒. Fig. 2.4 depicts the signaling game model for the deception with knowledge acquisition through 
investigation. 
 
 
Fig. 2.4: Signaling games with evidence acquisition by investigation. The probability 𝛾(𝑒|𝛹,𝑚) of emitting evidence 𝑒 depends on the event 𝛹 and the message 𝑚 sent by 𝑆. If the belief 𝜇b is informative, 𝜇b is used; if 𝜇b is uninformative, 𝛽b is used as the 
posterior. 
 
 
2.5.4 Equilibrium Concept 
The knowledge acquisition of the signaling game over continuous state space extends the PBNE 
in Definition 1 to the following. 
 
Definition 2.5: (Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) A PBNE of the game is a strategy profile (𝜎O, 𝜎b) and a posterior belief system (𝜇b, 𝛽b) that satisfy the following conditions: 
– (Deceiver’s Sequential Rationality) 𝑆  maximizes her expected utility given the deceivee’s 
strategy 𝜎b and the distribution of the evidence 𝑒: for each 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩, 𝜎O∗(𝜃) ∈ argmaxfg 𝑈O(𝜎b∗, 𝜃, 𝜎O). 
 
– (Deceivee’s Sequential Rationality) 𝑅 maximizes his expected utility given 𝑆’s strategy 𝜎O∗ 
and his posterior belief 𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚): for any 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 
• if 𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚) is informative, 𝜎b∗(𝑟,𝑚) ∈ argmaxfi∈7 𝑈bI∈J (𝜎b, 𝜃)𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚)𝑑𝜃;  
• if 𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚)  is uninformative over 𝛩À ≡ [𝜃¬, 𝜃o] ⊆ 𝛩 , 𝜎b∗(𝛹,𝑚, 𝑒) ∈argmax4¼ 𝛽JÂ¼C·ÃB (𝛹·|𝑚, 𝑒)𝑈b(𝑎· , 𝜃)𝑓(𝜃)𝑑 𝜃,  
  where 𝜃ÀB ≡ [𝜃¬, 𝜃µ], 𝜃ÀC ≡ [𝜃¬, 𝜃µ], and 𝑎· ≡ argmax 𝑈bIÂ¼ (𝑎, 𝜃)𝑑 𝜃. 
– (Consistent Belief) The posterior belief of 𝑅  is updated according to Bayes’ rule (i.e., 𝜇b 𝜃 𝑚  is informative), as 
𝜇b 𝜃 𝑚 = 𝑓 𝜃 𝑞O 𝑚 𝜃𝑓J 𝜃 𝑞O 𝑚 𝜃 𝑑 𝜃	.			 
– If 𝑓J (𝜃)𝑞O(𝑚| 𝜃)𝑑 𝜃 = 0, 𝜇b(𝜃|𝑚) may be set to any probability distribution over 𝛩. If 𝜇b is uninformative, i.e., 
𝜇b = 𝑓(𝜃)𝑓[I°,In] (𝜃)𝑑 𝜃	.			 
– 𝑅 acquires evidence through investigation, and updates belief using evidence as, 
𝛽b(𝛹|𝑒,𝑚) = 𝛾(𝑒|𝛹,𝑚)𝑃(𝛹)𝛾CÄÃB (𝑒|𝛹Ä,𝑚)𝑃(𝛹Ä), 
– and if 𝛾CÄÃB (𝑒|𝛹Ä,𝑚)𝑃(𝛹Ä) = 0, 𝛽b(𝛹|𝑒,𝑚) may be set to any probability distribution 
over 𝛩. 
In separating equilibrium, the deceiver sends message 𝑚 with different values of report 𝛺(𝑚) for 
different states. Separating equilibria are also called revealing equilibria because the strategic 
deceivee can infer the true state even if 𝛺(𝑚) does not tell the truth. In pooling equilibrium, the 
deceiver sends message 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀® with the same value of report 𝛺(𝑚) = 𝑟 for all states. In partial-
pooling equilibrium, however, the deceiver sends the message with the same report for some states 
and different reports for other states. Clearly, the PBNE strategy 𝜎O∗ associated with a DR (resp. 
UR) is pooling (resp. separating) strategy. 
 
2.5.5 Equilibrium Results 
From the definition of UR, the equilibrium strategy of 𝑅 gives the most preferred action, 𝛼b(𝜃) ≡𝜃, for all 𝜃 in the UR. Therefore, in any differentiable S-PBNE, the utility 𝑈O and the strategy 𝜎O 
have to satisfy the following first-order optimality condition given 𝜎b∗(𝜃) = 𝛼b(𝜃) according to 
the sequential rationality: 𝑈CO(𝛼b(𝜃), 𝜃, 𝜎O(𝜃)) ½Æi(I))½I + 𝑈jO(𝜃, 𝜃, 𝜎O(𝜃)) ½fg(I)½I = 0. 
Lemma 2.5 summarizes the property of the strategy 𝜎O∗ in any UR. 
Lemma 2.5: If [𝜃Ç, 𝜃È]  is an undeceivable region, then for each 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃Ç, 𝜃È] , the equilibrium 
strategy 𝜎O∗(𝜃) > 𝜃 and it is a unique solution of the differential equation 𝑑𝜎O(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 = 𝑏𝑘(𝜎O(𝜃) − 𝜃), 
with initial condition 𝜎O∗(𝜃Ç) = 𝜃Ç.  
 
Lemma 2.5 underlies the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.1: With initial condition 𝜎O∗(𝜃) = 𝜃, there exists a cut-off state 𝜃 < 𝜃 such that a 
unique solution 𝜎O∗  to the differential equation in Lemma 2.5 is well-defined on [𝜃, 𝜃]  with 𝜎O∗(𝜃) = 𝜃, and there is no solution on (𝜃 , 𝜃].  
 
Proposition 2.1 notes that in S-PBNE, the optimal strategy 𝜎O∗ of 𝑆 has to choose a report 𝑟 that 
is strictly larger than the true state 𝜃 , but eventually 𝜎O∗  runs out of such report for 𝜃 > 𝜃 . 
Proposition 2.1 implies that there is no S-PBNE strategy of 𝑆 for all 𝜃 > 𝜃, because there are not 
enough states to support the monotone S-PBNE strategy of 𝑆 for the state in (𝜃 , 𝜃]. This suggests 
a class of PP-PBNE for the state space 𝛩, which is separating in low states and pooling in higher 
states. For convention, let 𝜎O,k: 𝛩 → 𝛩 and 𝜂O,k, respectively, denote the P-PBNE strategy and the 
associated message strategy of 𝑆. We define this class of PP-PBNE by introducing a boundary 
state in the following precise sense. 
 
Definition 2.6: We say that the strategy 𝜎O is a SLAPH (Separating in Low states And Pooling 
in High states) strategy if there exists a boundary state 𝜃Ê ∈ [𝜃, 𝜃] such that 
1. (S-PBNE) 𝜎O∗(𝜃) = 𝑟  with 𝜂O∗(𝑟) ∈ 𝑀® , for all 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃, 𝜃Ê), and 𝜎O∗(𝜃) ≠ 𝜎O∗(𝜃′) for all 𝜃 ≠ 𝜃′ ∈ [𝜃, 𝜃Ê); 
2. (P-PBNE) 𝜎O∗,k(𝜃) = 𝜃 with 𝜂O∗,k(𝜃) ∈ 𝑀I, for all 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃Ê, 𝜃]. 
 
In any SLAPH equilibrium, both players have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium 
strategies. This requires the boundary state 𝜃Ê to be consistent in the sense that the equilibrium 
at 𝜃Ê  is well-defined. Specifically, the utility of 𝑆  has to satisfy the following boundary 
consistency (BC) condition at 𝜃Ê: 
 𝑈O(𝜎b∗(𝜎O,k(𝜃Ê),𝑚k), 𝜃Ê,𝑚k) = 𝑈O(𝛼b(𝜃Ê), 𝜃Ê,𝑚Ç), 
where 𝑚k ∈ 𝑀I  and 𝑚Ç ∈ 𝑀fg∗(IË) . The BC condition implies that 𝑆  is indifferent between 
sending 𝑚k ∈ 𝑀I with 𝑎∗ = 𝜎b∗(𝜎O∗(𝜃Ê),𝑚k) and sending 𝑚Ç ∈ 𝑀fg∗(IË) with action 𝑎∗ = 𝜃Ê. 
The conflict of interest, b, is a utility-relevant parameter for S that can induce incentives for S to 
reveal partial information about any state θ ∈ [θÌ, θ] to R while her utility-maximizing P-PBNE 
strategy σy∗ is maintained. This can be achieved based on the assumption |M | → ∞ and the fact 
that C¥ is equally expensive for all the messages chosen for all state θ ∈ [θÌ, θ]. Specifically, the 
P-PBNE region [θÌ, θ] can be further partitioned into multiple pools. First, some notations for 
describing the multiple pools are needed. Let ΘÍ ≡ (θB, θC, … , θÎC, θÎ) be a partition of [θÌ, θ], 
with θB = θÌ < θC < ⋯ < θÎ = θ. We call each interval ΘÐ,ÐÑC = [θÐ, θÐÑC] is a pool. With an 
abuse of notation, let ηy∗,Ò(σy∗(θ), θ) denote the message strategy that chooses a message 𝑚 ∈M∗( ) for a state θ. In each pool ΘÐ,ÐÑC, ηy∗,Ò(θ, θ) chooses the same message 𝑚 ∈ M , for all θ ∈ ΘÐ,ÐÑC, j = 0,… , K − 1. After R determines a pool ΘÐ,ÐÑC, she acquires evidence e ∈ {eB, eC} 
through investigations by dividing ΘÐ,ÐÑC  into two sub-intervals ΘÐ,ÐÑCB ≡ [θÐ, θÐ,ÐÑCÕ ] and ΘÐ,ÐÑCC ≡[θÐ,ÐÑCÕ , θÐÑC]. Let ΨÐ,ÐÑC ∈ ΓÐ,ÐÑC ≡ {ΨÐ,ÐÑCB , ΨÐ,ÐÑCC } such that ΨÐ,ÐÑC×  represents the event {θ ∈ ΘÐ,ÐÑC× }, 
with probability P(ΨÐ,ÐÑC× ) = ÙÚÛ,ÛÜÝÞ ( )ß ÙÚÛ,ÛÜÝ ( )ß ,  for i = 0 , 1 . On the equilibrium path, R  must play σU∗(ΨÐ,ÐÑC,𝑚Ð, e) as defined in Definition 2.5 for any mÐ  such that ηy∗,Ò(θ, θ) = 𝑚Ð  for all θ ∈ΘÐ,ÐÑC. Define 𝑎· (𝜃Ä, 𝜃ÄÑC) ≡ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥4 𝑈bJà,àÜÝ¼ (𝑎, 𝜃)𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃, 
for 𝑖 = 0, 1. 
 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of SLAPH equilibrium are summarized 
in the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2.3: (Necessary condition.) In any SLAPH equilibrium, there exists a boundary state 𝜃Ê  such that the pooling interval [𝜃Ê, 𝜃] can be partitioned into multiple pools denoted by a 
strictly increasing sequence (𝜃B, 𝜃C, … , 𝜃áC, 𝜃á) with 𝜃B = 𝜃Ê and 𝜃á = 𝜃, such that, for all 𝑗 =0,… , 𝐾 − 1,  𝑈7 𝑎 𝜃Ä, 𝜃ÄÑC , 𝜃ÄÑC = 𝑈7 𝑎 𝜃ÄÑC, 𝜃ÄÑh , 𝜃ÄÑC ,							(2.7) 𝑈O 𝑎 𝜃B, 𝜃C , 𝜃Ê, 𝜃 = 𝑈O 𝜃Ê, 𝜃Ê, 𝜎O∗ 𝜃Ê ,   	if	𝜃Ê > 𝜃,			(2.8) 
where 𝑎(𝜃Ä, 𝜃ÄÑC) = 𝑃C·ÃB (𝛹·) 𝑎· (𝜃Ä, 𝜃ÄÑC) , for all 𝑗 = 0,… , 𝐾 − 1 . (Sufficient Condition.) 
Given the multiple-pool PBNE characterized by Eq. (2.7)-(2.8), and if 𝜃Ê = ?̲? and 
𝑈O 𝑎 𝜃B, 𝜃C , 𝜃, 𝜃 ≤ 𝑈O 𝛼b 𝜃 , 𝜃, 𝜎O∗ 𝜃 ,						(2.9) 
 
there exists an SLAPH equilibrium. 
 
Note that 𝑈?  is equal for all 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃Ê, 𝜃]. Eq. (2.7) says that at each link state 𝜃ÄÑC connecting 𝛩Ä,ÄÑC  and 𝛩ÄÑC,ÄÑh , the utilities induced by 𝑎(𝜃Ä, 𝜃ÄÑC) and 𝑎(𝜃ÄÑC, 𝜃ÄÑh), respectively, should 
keep the same. Otherwise, 𝑆 has incentives to deviate from the current partition to combine these 
two consecutive pools by sending the message that induces more profitable 𝑈7 but the same 𝑈?. 
This is not ideal for 𝑅 because larger pools make the posterior less informative that could decrease 
the utilities for 𝑅. Similarly, Eq. (2.8) says that at the boundary state 𝜃Ê, 𝑆 should be indifferent 
between playing S-PBNE strategy and inducing action 𝜎b∗(𝜃Ê)  versus playing P-PBNE and 
introducing action 𝑎(𝜃B, 𝜃C). Inequality (2.9) notes that if the boundary state 𝜃Ê = 𝜃, then 𝑆 is 
indifferent between pooling with [𝜃, 𝜃C]  and reporting 𝜃  for 𝜃  versus separating at 𝜃 . The 
existence of SLAPH requires (2.7)-(2.9) to be jointly satisfied. 
 
 
2.6 Adaptive Strategic Cyber Defense for APT in Critical Infrastructure Network 
 
2.6.1 Multi-Stage Dynamic Bayesian Game Model 
In [18] and [19], Huang et al. have proposed a multi-stage Bayesian game framework to capture the 
stealthy, dynamic, and adaptive natures of the advanced persistent threats (APTs) as shown in Fig. 
2 .5. 
 
Fig. 2.5: The APTs’ life cycle includes a sequence of phases and stages such as the initial 
entry, privilege escalations, and lateral movements. APTs use each stage as a stepping 
stone for the next and aim to cause physical damages or collect confidential data. 
 
Continuous Type: Due to the cyber deception, the system defender 𝑅 cannot directly determine 
whether a user is legitimate or not even he can observe the user’s apparent behaviors. Thus, user 
𝑆  has a type 𝜃  which is a random variable and the realization 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩:= [0,1]  is private 
information of 𝑆. The value of the type indicates the strength of the user in terms of damages that 
she can inflict on the system. A user with a larger type value indicates a higher threat level. At 
each stage 𝑘 ∈ {0,1,⋯ , 𝐾}, 𝑆 chooses an action 𝑚ê ∈ 𝑀ê and 𝑅 chooses an action 𝑎ê ∈ 𝐴ê. The 
user’s actions represent the apparent behaviors and observable activities from log files such as a 
privilege escalation request and sensor access. A defender cannot identify the user’s type from 
observing his actions. The defender’s action includes prevention and proactive behaviors such as 
restricting the escalation request or monitoring the sensor access. The action pair (𝑚ê, 𝑎ê) is 
known to both players after stage 𝑘 and forms a history ℎê:= {𝑚B,⋯ ,𝑚êC, 𝑎B,⋯ , 𝑎êC}. The 
state 𝑥ê ∈ 𝒳ê shows the system status at each stage 𝑘 such as the location of the APTs. Since the 
initial state 𝑥B and history ℎê uniquely determine the state, 𝑥ê contains information of history up 
to 𝑘  and has the transition kernel described by 𝑥êÑC = 𝑔ê(𝑥ê,𝑚ê, 𝑎ê). The behavior mixed 
strategies 𝜎êO ∈ 𝛤êO:𝒳ê×𝛩 →△𝑀ê and 𝜎êb ∈ 𝛤êb:𝒳ê →△ 𝐴ê.  
 
Believe Update: To strategically gauge the user’s type, the defender specifies a belief 𝜇êb:𝒳ê ↦△ 𝛩 as a distribution over the type space according to the information available at stage 𝑘. The 
prior distribution of the user’s type is known to be 𝑓 and the belief of the type updates according 
to the Bayesian rule. 𝜇êÑCb (𝜃|𝑥êÑC) = 𝜇êb(𝜃|𝑥ê)𝜎êb(𝑎ê|𝑥ê, 𝜃)𝜇êbCB (𝜃 |𝑥ê)𝜎êb(𝑎ê|𝑥ê, 𝜃)𝑑 𝜃. 
Utility Function: The user’s type influences 𝑃·’s immediate payoff received at each stage 𝑘, i.e., 𝑈êO:𝒳ê×𝑀ê×𝐴ê×𝛩 ↦ ℝ. For example, a legitimate user’s access to the sensor benefits the system 
while a pernicious user’s access can incur a considerable loss. Define 𝜎êo:áO : = {𝜎êO ∈ 𝛤êO}êÃêo,⋯,á ∈𝛤êo:áO  as a sequence of policies from 𝑘′ to 𝐾. 
The defender has the objective to maximize the cumulative expected utility: 𝑈êo:áb (𝜎êo:áO , 𝜎êo:áb , 𝑥êo): = 𝐸I∼ðñi,lñ∼ñg,4ñ∼ñiáêÃêo 𝑈êb(𝑥ê,𝑚ê, 𝑎ê, 𝜃), 
and the user’s objective function is 
𝑈êo:áO (𝜎êo:áO , 𝜎êo:áb , 𝑥êo, 𝜃) = 𝜎êb4ñ∈7ñ
á
êÃêo (𝑎ê|𝑥ê) 𝜎êOlñ∈~ñ (𝑚ê|𝑥ê, 𝜃)𝑈êO. 
 
 
2.6.2 Equilibrium Concept 
The insider threats of APTs lead to the following definition of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
(PBNE) where the defender chooses the most rewarding policy to confront the attacker’s best-
response policies. 
Definition 2.7: In the two-person multi-stage game with a sequence of beliefs 𝜇êb, 𝑘 ∈ {𝑘′,⋯ , 𝐾} 
satisfying the Bayesian update in and the cumulative utility function 𝑈êo:áO , the set 𝑅hI,òñn(𝜎êo:áb ): ={𝛾 ∈ 𝛤êo:áO : 𝑈êo:áO (𝜎êo:áb , 𝛾, 𝑥êo, 𝜃) ≥ 𝑈êo:áO (𝜎êo:áb , 𝜎êo:áO , 𝑥êo, 𝜃), ∀𝛤êo:áb ∈ 𝛤êo:áb , ∀𝑥êo ∈ 𝒳êo, 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩}  is 𝑆’s best-response set to 𝑅’s policy 𝜎êo:áb ∈ 𝛤êo:áb  under state 𝑥êo and type 𝜃. 
 
 
Definition 2.8: In the two-person multi-stage Bayesian game with 𝑅  as the principal, the 
cumulative utility function 𝑈êo:áO , 𝑈êo:áb , the initial state 𝑥êo ∈ 𝒳êo, the type 𝜃 ∈ 𝛩, and a sequence 
of beliefs in , a sequence of strategies 𝜎êo:áb∗ ∈ 𝛤êo:áb  is called a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
(PBNE) for the principal, if 𝑈êo:áb∗ (𝑥êo): = inffñn:óg ∈bôm,õñn(fñn:ói∗ )𝑈êo:áb∗ (𝜎êo:áb∗ , 𝜎êo:áO , 𝑥êo). 
A strategy 𝜎êo:áO∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔maxfñn:óg ∈ñn:óg 𝑈êo:áO (𝜎êo:áb∗ , 𝜎êo:áO , 𝑥êo, 𝜃) is a PBNE for the agent 𝑆. 
 
A conjugate-prior method allows online computation of the belief and reduces Bayesian update 
into an iterative parameter update. The forwardly updated parameters are assimilated into the 
backward dynamic programming computation to characterize a computationally tractable and 
time-consistent equilibrium solution based on the expanded state space. 
 
 
2.6.3 Case Study 
 
We consider a four-stage transition with the first three stages related to cyber transition of the 
APTs and the last stage related to the benchmark Tennessee Eastman (TE) process as the targeted 
physical plant. The TE process involves two irreversible reactions to produce two liquid (liq) 
products. The process shuts down when the safety constraints are violated such as a high reactor 
pressure, a high/low separator/stripper liquid level. The attacker can revise the sensor reading, 
trigger an undesired feedback-control, and cause a loss. The state 𝑥ê  has five possible values 
representing the working status of the system where the state 1 is most desirable and state 5 is the 
least desirable. We can obtain the normal operation reward and the reward of attacks from the 
simulation. The belief state {𝛼ê, 𝛽ê} uniquely determines the belief distribution which is assumed 
to take the form of the beta distribution. The larger 𝛼ê means that the user is more likely to have a 
smaller type value and have lower threats to the system. 
 As shown in Fig. 2.6, a high value 𝑈êo:áb∗ (𝑥êo) for the defender is the result of a healthy system 
state 𝑥ê as well as a belief of a low-threat user. At the most desirable system state 𝑥ê = 1, attackers 
will not attack because the reward incurred is insufficient. Then the defender does not need to 
defend and obtains the maximum utility. 
 
Fig. 2.6:  Value function 𝑈ê′:áb∗ (𝑥ê′) under different expanded states {𝑥ê, 𝛼ê, 𝛽ê}. 
 
To investigate the effect of the defender’s belief, we change the belief state (𝛼ê, 𝛽ê) from (9,1) 
to (1,9), which means that the defender grows optimistically that the user is of a low threat level 
with a high probability. Since players’ value functions are of different scales in terms of the attack 
threshold and the probability, we normalize the value functions with respect to their maximum 
values to illustrate their trends and make them comparable to the threshold and the probability as 
shown in Fig. 2.7. When 𝛼ê  is large, the defender chooses to protect the system with a high 
probability, which completely deters attackers with any type values because the probability to 
attack is 0. 
 
As the defender trusts more about the user’s legitimacy, the defending probability decreases to 0 
when 𝛼ê = 1. Since the defender is less likely to defend, the attacker bears a smaller threshold 
to launch the attack. The resulted defending policy captures a tradeoff between security and 
economy and guarantees a high value for defenders at most of the belief states. 
  
 
Fig. 2.7: The effect of the defender’s belief. 
 
 
The central insight from the multi-stage analysis is the adversary’s tradeoff between the 
instantaneous reward and the hiding to arrive at a more favorable state in the future stages. The 
higher the belief of the defender in 𝑆  as a legitimate user, the less probability he will act 
defensively and thus the attacker has a smaller threshold to launch the attack. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Deception is a technique that can be viewed as an advanced approach to secure the devices or 
attacks. Understanding deception quantitatively is pivotal to provide rigor, predictability, and 
design principles. In this chapter, we have formulated signaling-game theoretic models of 
deceptions over discrete and continuous information spaces. We have studied leaky deception 
models and extended the baseline perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) to versions 
involving knowledge acquisitions characterized by evidences. We have analyzed the impacts of 
evidence on the belief updates and strategy constructions on the equilibrium path. 
In the binary state space, the leaky deception game with evidence admits an equilibrium that 
includes a regime in which the deceivee should choose whether to trust the deceiver based on the 
evidence, and regimes in which the deceivee should ignore the message and evidence and merely 
guess the private information based only on the prior probabilities. For the deceiver, the 
equilibrium results imply that it is optimal to partially reveal the private information in the 
former regime. 
 
We have also studied leaky deception games over a continuous one-dimensional information 
space. We have studied the PBNE as the solution concept to analyze the outcome of the 
deception game and characterize the deceivability of the game. The proposed deception game 
admits a class of PBNE called SLAPH (Separating in Low states And Pooling in High states). 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such PBNE are given. However, a 
full undeceivable region does not exist and there exists a deceivable region. We have also shown 
that the deceivable region can be partitioned into multiple sub-deceivable regions without 
decreasing total utilities for the deceiver when the conflict of interest is insignificant. 
 
Furthermore, we have explored a multi-stage incomplete information Bayesian game model for 
defensive deception frameworks for critical infrastructure networks with the presence of 
advanced persistent threats (APT). With the multi-stage and multi-phase structure of APTs, the 
belief of the defender is formed dynamically using observable footprints. The conjugate priors 
are used to reduce Bayesian updates into parameter updates, which leads to a computationally 
tractable extended-state dynamic programming that admits an equilibrium solution consistent 
with the forward belief update and backward induction. Tennessee Eastman process has been 
used as a case study to demonstrate the multi-stage deception game. The numerical simulations 
have shown that the game-theoretic defense strategies have significantly improved the security of 
the critical infrastructures. 
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